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INTRODUCTION
On September 28, 2015, a consumer sued a chocolate company.1
In her complaint, Ms. Elaine McCoy alleged that Nestlé USA
deceived her by failing to disclose slavery in its chocolate candy
supply chain.2 Nestlé USA produces some of its most popular
products—“Nestle Crunch, 100 Grand, Baby Ruth, Butterfingers,
Nestle Toll House, Nestle Hot Cocoa Mix, [and] Nestle Milk
Chocolate”—using cocoa beans from Côte d’Ivoire.3 Those beans are
grown by farming cooperatives in which the Fair Labor Association
discovered evidence of forced and child labor.4 Ms. McCoy claimed
that Nestlé’s continued sourcing from those cooperatives, without
disclosing the evidence of slavery to consumers, was a material
omission in violation of California consumer protection law.5
Ms. McCoy’s case was dismissed for failure to state a claim.6 But
Judge Joseph Spero of the Northern District of California acknowl-
edged a troubling reality for socially conscious chocolate lovers:
“Nestlé currently cannot trace the cocoa used in a particular Nestlé
chocolate product to a specific plantation, and there is thus no way
to know what labor practices were used in its production.”7 Nestlé
USA8 signed a 2001 international pact to end “the worst forms of
1. Complaint for Violation of California Consumer Protection Laws at 1, McCoy v. Nestle
USA, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 954 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (No. 15-cv-04451), appeal filed, No. 16-15794
(9th Cir. Apr. 29, 2016).
2. Id. paras. 10-12.
3. Id. para. 3.
4. Id. para. 9; FAIR LABOR ASS’N, INDEPENDENT EXTERNAL MONITORING OF NESTLÉ’S
COCOA SUPPLY CHAIN IN IVORY COAST: 2014-2015, at 3-4 (2015), http://www.fairlabor.org/sites/
default/files/documents/reports/september_2015_nestle_executive_summary.pdf [https://
perma.cc/EQZ6-TCB6]. This Note uses the terms “forced labor” and “slavery” synonymously.
5. Complaint for Violation of California Consumer Protection Laws, supra note 1,
paras.11-13.
6. See McCoy, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 972 (holding California’s Unfair Competition Law, Con-
sumers Legal Remedies Act, and False Advertising Law did not permit the relief requested
by Ms. McCoy).
7. Id. at 962.
8. Nestlé USA is a U.S. subsidiary of Nestlé S.A., the largest food company in the world.
Nestlé in the United States, NESTLÉ, https://www.nestleusa.com/media/press-information-and-
resources [https://perma.cc/5WC2-DPZ6]; see also Maggie McGrath, World’s Largest Food and
Beverage Companies 2017: Nestle, Pepsi and Coca-Cola Dominate the Field, FORBES (May 24,
2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiemcgrath/2017/05/24/worlds-largest-food-
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child labor” and forced labor in cocoa production.9 However, like
many global enterprises, Nestlé USA has struggled to achieve sup-
ply-chain awareness,10 a prerequisite for eliminating slavery from
its supply chain.11
The International Labour Organization estimates that 24.9 mil-
lion people globally are trapped in the forced labor economy,12 which
generates an estimated $150 billion in illegal profits per year.13
Additionally, the U.S. Department of Labor lists 139 goods from 75
countries it believes are produced by child and forced labor.14
Today’s multinational corporations encounter forced labor—nearly
always inadvertently—as they contract and subcontract production
abroad to cut costs.15 This problem transcends the chocolate
and-beverage-companies-2017-nestle-pepsi-and-coca-cola-dominate-the-landscape/
#185bd6893a69 [https://perma.cc/M8TY-WSXP].
9. CHOCOLATE MFRS. ASS’N, PROTOCOL FOR THE GROWING AND PROCESSING OF COCOA
BEANS AND THEIR DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS IN A MANNER THAT COMPLIES WITH ILO CONVENTION
182 CONCERNING THE PROHIBITION AND IMMEDIATE ACTION FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE
WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR 2 (2001), https://web.archive.org/web/20151208022828/http://
www.cocoainitiative.org/en/documents-manager/english/54-harkin-engel-protocol/file
[https://perma.cc/Y6ST-7MP7]. The Harkin-Engel Protocol, the chocolate industry’s attempt
at self-regulation, also aimed to produce a slave-free chocolate certification system by 2005.
Id. at 3. The industry has yet to develop a comprehensive certification system. PAYSON CTR.
FOR INT’L DEV. & TECH. TRANSFER, OVERSIGHT OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INITIATIVES TO
ELIMINATE THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR IN THE COCOA SECTOR IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE AND
GHANA 8 (2011), https://www.dol.gov/ilab/issues/child-labor/cocoa/Tulane_Final_ Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9S7C-57MF].
10. See McCoy, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 962.
11. FAIR LABOR ASS’N, ADDRESSING RISKS OF FORCED LABOR IN SUPPLY CHAINS: PROTEC-
TING WORKERS FROM UNFAIR RESTRICTIONS ON THEIR FREEDOMS AT WORK 7 (2017), http://
www.fairlabor.org/sites/default/files/documents/reports/addressing_forced_labor_in_
supply_chains_ august_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/MW97-5HQD].
12. INT’L LABOUR ORG. & WALK FREE FOUND., GLOBAL ESTIMATES OF MODERN SLAVERY:
FORCED LABOUR AND FORCED MARRIAGE 9-10 (2017), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/
public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_575479.pdf [https://perma.cc/
DD8W-HWKT].
13. INT’L LABOUR ORG., PROFITS AND POVERTY: THE ECONOMICS OF FORCED LABOUR 45
(2014), http: //www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public /---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/
publication/wcms_243391.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2PP-JT3Z].
14. BUREAU OF INT’L LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, LIST OF GOODS PRODUCED BY
CHILD LABOR OR FORCED LABOR 2 (2016), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
ilab/reports/child-labor/findings/TVPRA_Report2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LXA-H3TN].
15. See generally Doug Guthrie, Building Sustainable and Ethical Supply Chains, FORBES
(Mar. 9, 2012, 9:09 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougguthrie/2012/03/09/building-sustain
able-and-ethical-supply-chains/#396d117a4179 [https://perma.cc/VV23-2WZH].
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industry.16 Even Patagonia, a socially conscious apparel company
and corporate leader in fighting forced labor,17 discovered evidence
of trafficking and exploitation at most of the Taiwanese mills
producing raw materials for its clothing.18
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), investors, and consum-
ers have called for increased supply-chain accountability from
corporations.19 International leaders, including former President
Barack Obama20 and British Prime Minister Theresa May,21 have
answered the call. Consequently, public outcry against forced labor
in supply chains has changed, and will continue to change, multina-
tional corporations’ legal responsibilities.22
Many of these efforts, albeit noble, are inadequate to solve the
tremendous problem of corporate supply-chain abuses.23 In 2015,
consumers tried a new tactic for holding corporations accountable:
consumer activist litigation.24 Eight groups of California consumers
sued multinational corporations, including Costco,25 Hershey,26
Nestlé USA,27 and Mars,28 for not disclosing human rights abuses
16. BUREAU OF INT’L LABOR AFFAIRS, supra note 14, at 30-33 (listing 139 goods including
bananas, bricks, coal, cotton, gold, rice, shrimp, and soccer balls).
17. Gillian B. White, All Your Clothes Are Made with Exploited Labor, ATLANTIC (June
3, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/06/patagonia-labor-clothing-
factory-exploitation/394658/ [https://perma.cc/8LV4-8B3Y] (explaining how Patagonia cofound-
ed the Fair Labor Association, implemented factory auditing in the mid-1990s, and decreased
its number of suppliers). Patagonia should get credit for auditing its “second-tier suppliers,”
which many corporations avoid, perhaps for fear of discovering too much. See id.
18. Id.
19. See H.R. 3226, 114th Cong. § 2(a)(2) (2015).
20. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,627, 77 Fed. Reg. 60,029 (Sept. 25, 2012).
21. Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30 (Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/30/
pdfs/ukpga_20150030_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WQU-ZHBQ] (sponsored by then-Member of
Parliament (MP) Theresa May).
22. See infra Part I.
23. See infra Part II.
24. See infra Part III.
25. Sud v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 229 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2017), appeal filed sub
nom. Sud v. Costco, No. 17-15307 (9th Cir. Feb. 21, 2017).
26. Dana v. Hershey Co., 180 F. Supp. 3d 652, 654-55 (N.D. Cal. 2016), appeal filed, No.
16-15789 (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 2016).
27. McCoy v. Nestle USA, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 954, 956 (N.D. Cal. 2016), appeal filed, No.
16-15794 (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 2016); Barber v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 3d 954, 956 (C.D.
Cal. 2015), appeal filed, No. 16-55042 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2016).
28. Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2016), appeal filed, No. 16-
15444 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 2016); Wirth v. Mars Inc., No. SA CV 15-1470-DOC (KESx), 2016 WL
471234 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016), appeal filed, No. 16-55280 (9th Cir. Feb. 25, 2016).
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within their supply chains.29 This Note refers to these cases as the
“Early Eight.” The courts dismissed each of the Early Eight, al-
though six are currently on appeal with the Ninth Circuit.30
This Note focuses on the role of consumers in holding corporations
accountable for human rights abuses within their supply chains.
The launch point for this Note is the following question: Does a
socially conscious consumer (here, one that abhors slavery) that un-
knowingly purchases a good produced with slavery feel a cognizable
“harm” such that they should have a cause of action against the
producing corporation? The Early Eight attempt to answer that
question in the affirmative.31 This Note argues that it depends.
Specifically, this Note argues that consumers should use existing
legal mechanisms to hold corporations accountable for supply-chain
practices. In arguing this, this Note neither attempts to solve the
complex problem of slavery in corporate supply chains nor suggests
this approach presents the proper incentives for corporations to
remedy abuses.32 Rather, it asserts that consumers should seek
29. The other two “Early Eight” cases are De Rosa v. Tri-Union Seafoods, LLC, No. CV
15-07540-CJC(AGRx), 2016 WL 524059 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2016), and Hughes v. Big Heart Pet
Brands, No. CV 15-08007-CJC(AGRx), 2016 WL 524057 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2016).
30. Sud, 229 F. Supp. 3d 1075; Dana, 180 F. Supp. 3d 652; McCoy, 173 F. Supp. 3d 954;
Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016; Wirth, 2016 WL 471234; Barber, 154 F. Supp. 3d 954.
31. See infra Part III.
32. This Note leaves those proposals to academics who have written fervently on the topic.
See generally, e.g., David J. Doorey, Who Made That?: Influencing Foreign Labour Practices
Through Reflexive Domestic Disclosure Regulation, 43 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 353, 377-403 (2005)
(advocating for the disclosure of factory locations because it would provide meaningful
information at a low cost, engage local communities, and help identify companies that “cut
and run” from supply-chain problems); Meredith R. Miller, Corporate Codes of Conduct and
Working Conditions in the Global Supply Chain, in THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
LANDSCAPE 432, 459-62 (Jena Martin & Karen E. Bravo eds., 2016) (proposing required
corporate disclosure on whether a company has a supplier code of conduct and advocating for
“serious commitment[s] to terminat[e] non-compliant suppliers”); Marcia L. Narine, Living
in a Material World—From Naming and Shaming to Knowing and Showing, in THE BUSINESS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS LANDSCAPE, supra, at 219, 251 (proposing executive compensation
clawback provisions to incentivize corporate supply-chain engagement); Kishanthi Parella,
Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH. L. REV. 747, 802-15 (2014) (advocating for
approaches that incentivize supplier engagement instead of buyer-only disclosure regimes);
Laura Ezell, Note, Human Trafficking in Multinational Supply Chains: A Corporate Director’s
Fiduciary Duty to Monitor and Eliminate Human Trafficking Violations, 69 VAND. L. REV.
499, 532-40 (2016) (endorsing “[d]uty to [m]onitor” follow-on shareholder litigation after
corporate TVPRA liability). This Note examines only the consumer’s role in the accountability
debate.
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legal action after experiencing a cognizable harm, which has not yet
occurred.33
Future consumer claims may plausibly fare better than the Early
Eight.34 For support, this Note draws on recent consumer protection
application in the data privacy context.35 Additionally, two changes
in the supply-chain disclosure context—one actual and one as-
sumed—will likely also play a role.36 First, the UK Modern Slavery
Act of 2015 increased the number of companies required to disclose
supply-chain practices and policies,37 so more disclosures will enter
the marketplace. Second, this Note assumes that consumers will
continue to increase the demand for ethically sourced products.38 As
companies respond to increased consumer demand, they will com-
pete on supply-chain disclosures,39 and it is possible that some will
misrepresent their practices. Companies misrepresent their data-
privacy efforts with some frequency,40 and a similar phenomenon
could occur in the supply-chain context. When a material misrepre-
sentation occurs, consumers or the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) will then have seasonable grounds for consumer redress.41
This Note contains four parts. Part I introduces the supply-chain
regulatory schemes with which today’s corporations must comply.
Part II analyzes the most popular regulatory framework—manda-
tory supply-chain disclosure—and argues its inefficacy in enabling
33. See infra Part III.
34. See infra Part IV.
35. See infra Part IV.
36. See infra Part IV.
37. See HOME OFFICE, MODERN SLAVERY AND SUPPLY CHAINS CONSULTATION 15, https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/448201/2015-02-
12_TISC_Consultation_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HLX-YHLH].
38. See Bryan Nella, Consumer Study: Food, Apparel, & Pharmaceutical Industries Face
Uphill Battle to Ensure Responsible Overseas Production, GTNEXUS (Nov. 9, 2015), http://
www.gtnexus.com/resources/blog-posts/supply-chain-visibility-and-transparency [https://
perma.cc/WM7V-Z58H]. But see Michael E. Young & Anthony W. McCoy, Millennials and
Chocolate Product Ethics: Saying One Thing and Doing Another, 49 FOOD QUALITY & PREFER-
ENCE 43, 52 (2016) (finding millennials “unwilling to pay the substantially higher price
necessary” to create organic and ethically sourced products).
39. Natalie Taylor, HAVI Identifies Five Trends for 2017 Impacting Foodservice Supply
Chains, GROCERY HEADQUARTERS (Mar. 7, 2017, 11:15 AM), http://www.groceryheadquarters.
com/News/HAVI-Identifies-Five-Trends-for-2017-Impacting-Foodservice-Supply-Chains/
[https://perma.cc/4RQ8-66TP].
40. See infra Part IV.
41. See infra Part IV.
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consumers to hold corporations accountable. Part III evaluates the
Early Eight and the pitfalls of private consumer protection litigation
applied in this context. Finally, Part IV argues that, in the future,
corporations may misrepresent their supply-chain practices, creat-
ing a cognizable consumer harm and enabling consumer redress. A
brief conclusion follows.
I. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS TO FIGHT FORCED LABOR IN
CORPORATE SUPPLY CHAINS
The United States abolished slavery in 1865,42 yet Americans
seemingly remained ignorant of human rights abuses in corporate
supply chains until the 1990s.43 That changed with two events. In
the early 1990s, reports revealed that Nike sold shoes made in
Indonesian sweatshops.44 And in 1992, Dateline NBC reported that
Wal-Mart sold goods from Bangladeshi factories employing child
labor.45 These incidents sparked a broader public conversation on
corporate supply-chain practices, including protests on college cam-
puses and industry engagement.46 Even with increased modern
awareness to the problem in the 1990s, legislatures waited until
2010 to begin combatting human rights abuses in supply chains.47
42. 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, LIBR. CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/rr/
program/bib/ourdocs/13thamendment.html [https://perma.cc/XM5V-XKHG].
43. See generally Cristina A. Cedillo Torres et al., Four Case Studies on Corporate Social
Responsibility: Do Conflicts Affect a Company’s Corporate Social Responsibility Policy?, 8
UTRECHT L. REV. 51, 51-52 (2012); Jennifer Gordon, Regulating the Human Supply Chain, 102
IOWA L. REV. 445, 479 (2017). To be fair, modern corporations did not begin large-scale
outsourcing until the late 1980s. See Rob Handfield, A Brief History of Outsourcing, N.C.
STATE U. (June 1, 2006), https://scm.ncsu.edu/scm-articles/article/a-brief-history-of-out sourc-
ing [https://perma.cc/WU4K-ZFVW].
44. See Max Nisen, How Nike Solved Its Sweatshop Problem, BUS. INSIDER (May 9, 2013,
10:00 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-nike-solved-its-sweatshop-problem-2013-5
[https://perma.cc/J6KQ-3PLX].
45. Thomas C. Hayes, Wal-Mart Disputes Report on Labor, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 1992),
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/24/business/wal-mart-disputes-report-on-labor.html [https://
perma.cc/45RF-6CV2].
46. See Nisen, supra note 44.
47. See Erika C. Collins & Larissa Boz, Full Disclosure: An Overview of Global Supply
Chain Regulations, PROSKAUER (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.internationallaborlaw.com/2016/03/
03/full-disclosure-an-overview-of-global-supply-chain-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/X2CP-
CVK6]. The notable exception was Brazil’s “Lista Suja,” beginning in 2004, discussed in Part
I.A.
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Legislative efforts have taken different approaches to incentivize
supply-chain accountability. Some employed direct regulation be-
tween the government and corporate actors, described in Part I.A.
Others prescribed indirect regulation, by strengthening private
rights of action against corporations or creating corporate supply-
chain disclosure regimes, discussed in Part I.B.
A. Direct Regulations Between Governments and Corporate Actors
In direct or “command-and-control” regulation, governments
adopt paternalistic “legal rules backed by [civil or criminal] sanc-
tions.”48 In the supply-chain context, for example, the U.S. Congress
could use its Commerce Clause or taxing powers to prohibit, regu-
late, or tax products in interstate commerce tainted with slave
labor.49
In the United States, there have been two major direct regulatory
developments in the last five years. First, Congress enacted a feder-
al contracting compliance regime, which penalizes federal contrac-
tors and subcontractors found to have “engage[d] in” forced labor.50
Second, Congress closed an eighty-five-year-old customs loophole,
bolstering the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s ability to ban
imported products tainted with forced labor.51
In South America, the Brazilian government implemented an
aggressive antislavery scheme in 2004.52 The regime was called
“Lista Suja,” or “Dirty List,” (List) whereby the Brazilian govern-
ment “name[d] and shame[d]” companies with forced labor in their
supply chains.53 Membership on the List affected companies in sev-
eral ways. First, the Brazilian government excluded all List mem-
bers from bidding on public contracts.54 Equally important, several
48. Doorey, supra note 32, at 366.
49. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3.
50. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239,
§§ 1701-1708, 126 Stat. 1632, 2092-98.
51. See Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-125, § 910,
130 Stat. 122, 239-40 (2016) (repealing the “consumptive demand exception”). 
52. See Ashley Feasley, Deploying Disclosure Laws to Eliminate Forced Labour: Supply
Chain Transparency Efforts of Brazil and the United States of America, 5 ANTI-TRAFFICKING
REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 30, 35 (2015).
53. Id. at 35-36.
54. Id. at 38.
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banks and private parties signed a pact agreeing to end dealings
with List members.55 As a result, the List promoted public-private
partnership to fight modern-day slavery.56 Brazil maintained the
List for about ten years.57 In 2014, however, Brazil suspended the
List after two companies building stadiums for the 2014 World Cup
landed on it, and Brazil reinstated the List in a weaker form in
2015.58
Direct regulation often attracts criticism because the regulator
underestimates the complexity of the problem, lacks expertise to
address it, or both.59 In contrast, indirect regulation benefits from
interested market actors rather than government enforcement.60 So
far, indirect regulation is much preferred in this context.61
B. Targeting the Consumer Through Indirect Regulation
Indirect regulation empowers others to impose sanctions on
noncompliant entities.62 The “others” are interested market
participants or individuals harmed by the conduct.63 For example,
the Trafficking Victim Protections Reauthorizations Act (TVPRA)
of 2008 enabled human trafficking victims to obtain civil redress
against corporations that benefit financially from their labor.64
Corporate information disclosure is a popular form of indirect
regulation.65 Disclosure regimes merely require companies to release
information.66 Through this mechanism, the government actor
attempts to “influence normative practices indirectly by shaping the
55. Id. at 36-37.
56. See id.
57. Cf. id. at 39.
58. Id. at 38-40.
59. Doorey, supra note 32, at 367.
60. See id. at 366-68.
61. See id. at 367-68; infra Part II.
62. See Doorey, supra note 32, at 366-68.
63. Id.
64. See Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1595
(2012). For a full treatment of the TVPRA’s application to multinational corporations, see
Ezell, supra note 32, at 518-30.
65. See Doorey, supra note 32, at 353.
66. Alexandra Prokopets, Note, Trafficking in Information: Evaluating the Efficacy of the
California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010, 37 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
351, 354-55 (2014).
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context in which society’s various actors and subsystems interact
and bargain with one another.”67
In this context, two existing regimes—California’s Transparency
in Supply Chains Act of 2010 and the UK’s Modern Slavery Act
2015—require corporations to disclose “efforts” taken to monitor and
eradicate slavery from their supply chains.68 A third and often-pro-
posed congressional regime, if passed, would require supply-chain
disclosures to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).69
These disclosure regimes are presented as powerful weapons to
fight modern-day slavery.70 They begin by recognizing consumers’
collective buying power as sufficient to change business practices.71
They also purport to empower consumer activists in two ways. First,
in response to companies disclosing supply-chain abuses, consumers
can impose marketplace sanctions, such as boycotts or social media
shaming.72 This risk of reputational harm creates an indirect
incentive for companies to remedy supply-chain abuses ex ante.73
Second, consumer advocates can use disclosures to make purchasing
decisions among competing brands.74 By rewarding clean companies
and punishing bad actors, consumers can effect changes in corporate
behavior.75
As Louis Brandeis famously wrote, “Sunlight is said to be the best
of disinfectants.”76 In the supply-chain context, mandatory corporate
disclosure is the “sunlight” believed to alter corporate behavior.77
67. See Doorey, supra note 32, at 357 (emphasis added).
68. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(a)(1) (West 2017); Modern Slavery Act 2015, c.30, § 54(4)
(Eng.).
69. See S. 1968, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015); H.R. 3226, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015); H.R. 4842,
113th Cong. § 3 (2014); H.R. 2759, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).
70. See, e.g., 2010 Cal. Legis. Serv. 2642 (West) (recognizing consumers can “force the
eradication of slavery and trafficking by way of their purchasing decisions”).
71. See id. (“Absent publicly available disclosures ... [c]onsumers are at a disadvantage
in being able to force the eradication of slavery and trafficking by way of their purchasing
decisions.”); see also S. 1968 § 2; H.R. 3226 § 2; HOME OFFICE, TRANSPARENCY IN SUPPLY
CHAINS ETC.: A PRACTICAL GUIDE para. 2.8 (2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/471996/Transparency_in_Supply_Chains_etc__A_pra
ctical_guide__final_.pdf [https://perma.cc/84H2-KT77].
72. See HOME OFFICE, supra note 71, para. 2.8.
73. Id.
74. See 2010 Cal. Legis. Serv. 2642; see also H.R. 3226 § 2(b)(3)-(4).
75. See generally H.R. 3226 § 2(b)(3)-(4); 2010 Cal. Legis. Serv. 2642.
76. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914).
77. See infra Part II.
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II. WHY SUPPLY-CHAIN DISCLOSURE LAWS FAIL AS CONSUMER
ACTIVIST TOOLS
Although the existing disclosure regimes—the California
Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010 and the UK Modern
Slavery Act 2015—aim to empower collective consumer action,78
fundamental flaws in their designs limit their efficacy.79 Their two
main flaws are drafting imprecision and the lack of a meaningful
enforcement mechanism.80 Other regimes, such as the often-pro-
posed U.S. Business Supply Chain Transparency on Trafficking and
Slavery Act and the French “Corporate Duty of Vigilance” Law, for
the reasons discussed below,81 also appear unlikely to empower sig-
nificant, collective consumer action.
A. The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010
The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act (California
Act) requires “retail seller[s] and manufacturer[s] doing business in
[California]” and generating over $100 million in annual revenue to
disclose their “efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking
from [their] direct supply chain[s].”82 The California Act denotes
specific categories of efforts, if taken, which a company must dis-
close83 and requires access to the disclosure on the company’s
78. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
79. See infra Parts II.A-B.
80. See infra Parts II.A-B.
81. See infra Parts II.C-D.
82. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(a)(1) (West 2017) (emphasis added). “Doing business in
[California]” is defined by CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23101 as any of the following: (1) domiciled
in California, (2) generates revenue of $500,000 or 25 percent of the corporation’s total
revenue in California, (3) maintains property of over $50,000 or 25 percent of the company’s
total property in California, or (4) pays compensation of over $50,000 or 25 percent of the
company’s total compensation to California employees. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(a)(2)(A);
CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23101(b)(1)-(4) (West 2018). Thus, the phrase “doing business,”
though seemingly benign, is a major limitation in the Act’s scope. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§ 23101(b)(1)-(4).
83. A covered entity must “disclose to what extent, if any,” it:
(1) Engages in verification of product supply chains to evaluate and address
risks of human trafficking ....
(2) Conducts audits of suppliers to evaluate supplier compliance with company
standards for trafficking and slavery in supply chains....
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website.84 In essence, if a covered entity takes any “efforts” to eval-
uate or address supply-chain problems, the California Act forces
disclosure of those efforts.85
The California Act’s legislative history expressly identifies
consumers as a target audience for the disclosures.86 For instance,
the California Act states that consumers were (before the Act)
“inadvertently promoting and sanctioning” forced labor by purchas-
ing slave-derived products.87 Furthermore, it explains that without
these disclosures, consumers are “disadvantage[d]” in their inability
(1) “to distinguish companies on the merits of their efforts to supply
products free from the taint of slavery,” and thus also (2) “to force
the eradication of slavery ... by way of their purchasing decisions.”88
The California Act, therefore, presents itself as a consumer empow-
erment bill.
Despite the California Act’s vision as a consumer tool, a few de-
fects are apparent on its face. First, the law requires only disclosure
of “efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking.”89 Disclosing
“efforts” is different than disclosing whether the company actually
has forced labor in its supply chain. Only the former is required.90
Moreover, a company could comply fully by disclosing “no efforts
taken.”91 As a result, the California Act’s disclosures retain little
(3) Requires direct suppliers to certify that materials incorporated into the
product comply with the laws regarding slavery and human trafficking of the
country or countries in which they are doing business.
(4) Maintains internal accountability standards and procedures for employees
or contractors failing to meet company standards regarding slavery and
trafficking.
(5) Provides company employees and management, who have direct responsibil-
ity for supply chain management, training on human trafficking and slavery,
particularly with respect to mitigating risks within the supply chains of
products.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(c)(1)-(5).
84. Id. § 1714.43(b). For a searchable database of all Transparency statements, see SB 657
Disclosure Search, KNOWTHECHAIN, https://knowthechain.org/sb657-search/ [https://perma.
cc/2XWP-F8FK].
85. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(a)(1).
86. 2010 Cal. Legis. Serv. 2642 § 2(h)-(j) (West).
87. Id. § 2(h).
88. Id. § 2(i).
89. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(a)(1) (emphasis added).
90. See id.
91. Id. § 1714.43(c) (“The disclosure ... shall ... disclose to what extent, if any, that the
[company] does each of the following...” (emphasis added)); KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF
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usefulness for the socially conscious consumer.92 For example, a
company that takes “no efforts” might face zero supply-chain risk,
whereas a company that discloses its several efforts may utilize a
supply chain with significant forced labor.93
Second, the California Act only mandates disclosure of efforts
taken in a company’s “direct supply chain,” rather than its “ex-
tended” or “ultimate” supply chain.94 In supply-chain-management
parlance, a “direct” supply chain entails “a company, a supplier, and
a customer.”95 Conversely, an “extended” supply chain entails the
entity and two links on either side (supplier and customer), and an
“ultimate” supply chain consists of every link from the “ultimate
supplier to the ultimate customer.”96 As the introductory Patagonia
example suggests, companies with clean first-tier suppliers may
have forced labor at the second or third tiers.97 A consumer relying
on a company’s California disclosure might be misled to believing
many efforts in a “direct supply chain” correlates with little to no
slavery in the ultimate supply chain.98
Several other technical weaknesses limit consumers’ ability to
hold companies accountable. For instance, the seemingly benign
phrase “[d]oing business in [California]” limits the scope of covered
entities.99 The California Act limits itself again, to covering only
“retail seller[s] [or] manufacturer[s]” as defined by a corporation’s
California tax filing.100 Additionally, the law does not require per-
iodic updates.101 Thus, a company could remain in compliance by
JUSTICE, THE CALIFORNIA TRANSPARENCY IN SUPPLY CHAINS ACT: A RESOURCE GUIDE 4 (2015),
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/sb657/resource-guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8VV-
GWF9].
92. See Prokopets, supra note 66, at 362-63.
93. Id.
94. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(a)(1). See generally John T. Mentzer et al., Defining Supply
Chain Management, J. BUS. LOGISTICS, Autumn 2001, at 1, 4.
95. Mentzer, supra note 94, at 4.
96. Id.
97. See White, supra note 17; see also ADIDAS GROUP, MODERN SLAVERY RISK ASSESSMENT
3-4 (2016), https://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/adidasGroup_
Summary_Modern%20Slavery%20Risk%20Assessment_Aug2016rev%20%28002%29.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EJB2-VCZX] (identifying “Tier 2” and “Tier 3” modern-slavery risks).
98. Mentzer, supra note 94, at 4.
99. See supra note 82.
100. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(a)(1), (a)(2)(c)-(d) (West 2017).
101. KNOWTHECHAIN, INSIGHTS BRIEF: FIVE YEARS OF THE CALIFORNIA TRANSPARENCY IN
SUPPLY CHAINS ACT 8 (2015), https://knowthechain.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/KnowThe
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publishing one statement and never updating it.102 Finally, the
California Act does not require public disclosure of the covered enti-
ties, which limits consumers’ ability to discern whether a nondis-
closing company is in violation of the law or simply not covered.103
The largest defect of the California Act, however, is its enforce-
ment mechanism (or lack thereof). The “exclusive remedy” for failed
disclosure is “an action brought by the [California] Attorney General
for injunctive relief.”104 In other words, the only remedy against
noncompliance is the California Attorney General suing to force the
corporation’s disclosure (compliance) under the Act.105 No financial
penalty may be levied against noncompliant corporations.106 Nor can
consumers sue under the California Act to force compliance.107 Thus,
the law imposes no real penalty for companies that fail to comply or
that insufficiently comply.
The results of the California Act—in effect since January 1,
2012108—have been mixed. One recent study found that only 31
percent of companies surveyed had a disclosure statement in
compliance with all of the Act’s requirements.109 In a consistent
finding, another study found only 62 percent of covered companies
disclosed and gave only 41 percent of disclosing companies a pass-
ing score.110 Several household companies—such as Guess?, Intuit,
Chain_InsightsBrief_093015.pdf [https://perma.cc/MX9E-7H5D].
102. Prokopets, supra note 66, at 363.
103. KNOWTHECHAIN, supra note 101, at 5; Jonathan Todres, Legal Glitch Means Traffick-
ing Transparency Law Isn’t So Transparent, CNN (June 16, 2015, 7:08 AM), http://edition.
cnn.com/2015/06/16/opinions/california-transparency-supply-chains-law-trafficking/ [https://
perma.cc/EW8M-TXKM].




108. Morgan Windsor, In California, Companies Struggle to Combat Human Trafficking,
Slavery in Compliance with Transparency in Supply Chain Act: Report, INT’L BUS. TIMES
(Nov. 4, 2015, 2:30 PM), http://www.ibtimes .com/california-companies-struggle-combat-
human-trafficking-slavery-compliance-2169350 [https://perma.cc/UM39-TVH5].
109. KNOWTHECHAIN, supra note 101, at 5.
110. DEV. INT’L, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE CALIFORNIA TRANSPARENCY IN SUPPLY
CHAINS ACT OF 2010, at 2 (2015), http://media.wix.com/ugd/f0f801_0276d7c94ebe453f8648b91
dd35898ba.pdf [https://perma.cc/BD2N-M2U6].
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K-Swiss, Vulcan Materials, and Netflix—as of the date of this Note,
have not published a Transparency statement.111
Despite the lackluster results, in some ways, studies like those
above are exactly what the California Act aimed to encourage:
NGOs and private parties holding companies accountable through
nonlegal means.112 Furthermore, benchmark studies, such as a
recent study of the food and beverage industry,113 promote compari-
sons between corporations, encourage industry standards, and cre-
ate competition on efforts and transparency.114 For instance, the
Food and Beverage Benchmark Findings Report on supply-chain
disclosures rated Unilever a “65” (the highest of 20 studied), Coca-
Cola a “58,” Pepsi a “45,” Tyson a “13,” Kraft Heinz a “9,” and Mon-
ster a “0” (the lowest).115 Whether consumers will begin to purchase
Coca-Cola over Pepsi because of these comparisons remains to be
seen.
B. UK Modern Slavery Act 2015
The UK Modern Slavery Act (MSA) became law in March 2015.116
The MSA requires companies to publish supply-chain transparency
statements similar to those of the California Act.117 In particular,
111. Compare KnowTheChain, See Which Companies Do and Do Not Have Statements Un-
der the California Transparency in Supply Act, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CTR., https://
business-humanrights.org/en/know-the-chain-%E2%80%93-see-which-companies-do-and-do-
not-have-statements-under-the-california-transparency-in-supply-chains-act [https://perma.cc/
53XB-3V8T], with KNOWTHECHAIN, supra note 84. Guess?, however, published in-depth
supply-chain data, policies, and commitments in its most recent Sustainability Report.  See
GUESS?, FISCAL 2016-2017 SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 36-43 (2017), http://sustainability.guess.
com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/GUESS-FY16-17-Sustainability-Report.pdf [https://perma.
cc/EZT3-HQQU]. Additionally, Intuit maintains a Supplier Code of Conduct on its website.
See Supplier Code of Conduct, INTUIT, https://www.intuit.com/company/strategic-sourcing/
supplier-code-of-conduct/ [https://perma.cc/W72K-SUSX].
112. See 2010 Cal. Legis. Serv. 2642 § 2(h)-(j) (West).
113. See id.; KNOWTHECHAIN, FOOD & BEVERAGE BENCHMARK FINDINGS REPORT 6 (2016),
https://knowthechain.org/wp-content/plugins/ktc-benchmark/app/public/images/benchmark_
reports/KTC_Food_Beverage_Findings_Report_October.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SKK-2JXC].
114. See KNOWTHECHAIN, supra note 113, at 4, 7.
115. See id. at 9.
116. See Modern Slavery Act 2015, PARLIAMENT.UK, http://services.parliament.uk/bills/
2014-15/modernslavery.html [https://perma.cc/7CNV-KMCM].
117. See Modern Slavery Act 2015 c. 30, § 54 (Eng.). For an updated database of MSA
statements, see Modern Slavery Registry, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CTR., http://www.
modernslaveryregistry.org [https://perma.cc/4LB2-RP3J] (listing links to over 2900 MSA
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the MSA covers “commercial organisation[s]” that do business in the
UK and earn more than £36 million globally per year,118 and re-
quires them to disclose “steps ... taken during the financial year to
ensure that slavery and human trafficking is not taking place ... in
any of its supply chains.”119 Again, the same rule applies: if a com-
pany takes “steps,” it must disclose them.
Several improvements from the California Act are discernable.
First, the scope of companies covered under the MSA is far greater
than those covered under the California Act.120 Parliament esti-
mated that 12,259 companies would be subject to the MSA disclo-
sure requirements,121 whereas only an estimated 1700 companies
are subject to the California Act.122 Second, the MSA covers steps
taken in “any of [a corporation’s] supply chains,” as opposed to just
one’s direct supply chain.123 Finally, the MSA requires yearly
updates.124
However, the MSA suffers from the same fatal flaw as the Cali-
fornia Act—the lack of meaningful enforcement against companies
that fail to disclose. Like the California Act, the MSA only provides
injunctive relief by the Secretary of State for noncompliance.125
There are no financial or criminal penalties for noncompliance, and
consumers again lack a cause of action.126 Rather, Parliament hopes
that consumers, investors, and NGOs “engage and/or apply pres-
sure” on businesses failing to disclose.127
statements).
118. Modern Slavery Act 2015, c.30, § 54(1)-(2); HOME OFFICE, supra note 71, para. 2.2.
119. Modern Slavery Act 2015, c.30, § 54(4)(a). Unlike the California bill, which requires
specific categories of disclosures, see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(c) (West 2017), the MSA merely
recommends specific categories of disclosures, see Modern Slavery Act 2015, c.30, § 54(5)(a)-(f).
120. See HOME OFFICE, supra note 37, at 15. This is because the statute has a lesser annual
revenue threshold and because it defines “commercial organisation[s]” as all companies that
“suppl[y] goods or services,” not limiting itself to narrowly defined categories of “retai[l] sellers
[or] manufacturer[s].” Compare Modern Slavery Act 2015, c.30, § 54(1)-(2), with CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1714.43(a)(1), (a)(2)(C)-(D).
121. See HOME OFFICE, supra note 37, at 15 tbl.1.
122. HARRIS, supra note 91, at 3.
123. Modern Slavery Act 2015, c.30, § 54(4)(a)(i).
124. Id. § 54(4)(a) (requiring the statement include the “steps ... taken during the financial
year”).
125. Id. § 54(11).
126. Id.
127. HOME OFFICE, supra note 71, para. 2.8.
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Because of its recency it is unclear whether the MSA has been
effective. The first businesses required to disclose were ones with a
year-end of March 31, 2016, and Parliament recommended a
deadline of September 30, 2016.128 However, one study of 239 early
reporting companies found a disappointing 35 percent failed to dis-
cuss their risk-assessment process and that “most statements ... pro-
vide little detail beyond general commitments and broad indications
of processes.”129 In another survey, out of 34 companies, only 62 per-
cent were confident in understanding their supply-chain risks after
preparing their MSA statement.130 On a positive note, 76 percent of
responders believed their directors are more involved with supply-
chain risk discussions after preparing their MSA statement.131
C. The Oft-Proposed U.S. Business Supply Chain Transparency
on Trafficking and Slavery Act
U.S. Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney has proposed a supply-
chain transparency bill in each of the past three congressional
terms.132 Her bill, the U.S. Business Supply Chain Transparency on
Trafficking and Slavery Act (U.S. Bill), differs significantly from the
existing disclosure regimes in that it would amend section 13 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and require annual supply-chain
disclosures in SEC filings.133 In other words, the U.S. Bill would na-
tionalize a supply-chain disclosure regime for public companies.134
In the most recent congressional term, Senator Richard Blumenthal
introduced a companion bill.135 Although a similar bill has not been
128. Id. para. 8.4 (“[W]e would encourage organisations to report within six months of ...
year end.”).
129. ERGON ASSOCS., REPORTING ON MODERN SLAVERY: THE CURRENT STATE OF DISCLOSURE
3 (2016), http://ergonassociates.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Reporting-on-Modern-Slavery
2-May-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/FVE2-MRQ2].
130. ERGON, HAS THE MODERN SLAVERY ACT HAD AN IMPACT ON YOUR BUSINESS? 6 (2016),
https://www.business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/msa-report-ergon-oct
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/TNE6-TDDZ].
131. Id. at 4.
132. See H.R. 3226, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 4842, 113th Cong. (2014); H.R. 2759, 112th
Cong. (2011).
133. See S. 1968, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015). For discussion on the SEC’s disclosure authority
beyond material financial information, see H.R. 3226 § 3; Doorey, supra note 32, at 388-90.
134. See H.R. 3226 § 3.
135. S. 1968.
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introduced in the 115th Congress, momentum suggests it is only a
matter of time. Last term’s Senate companion bill is a positive sign,
and the U.S. Bill’s last introduction in the House was met with
several new cosponsors.136
If reintroduced and passed, the U.S. Bill would require public
issuers with greater than $100 million in global revenue annually
to disclose their “measures taken” to “combat” the use of forced labor
and human trafficking in their supply chains.137 Like the MSA, the
U.S. Bill defines “supply chain” broadly and would require annual
updates.138 Several other similarities exist between the existing re-
gimes and the U.S. Bill. First, the U.S. Bill acknowledged its role to
inform and shape consumer purchases.139 Also, the U.S. Bill sug-
gests a covered entity could comply by writing “no measures
taken.”140
The U.S. Bill would require disclosure beyond the other regimes—
specifically, if a corporation takes any effort “to evaluate and
address the risks of forced labor,” the disclosure must “describe any
risks identified within the supply chain, and the measures taken
toward eliminating those risks.”141 Both the California Act and the
MSA require disclosure only of “efforts” or “steps” taken—neither
law forces affirmative disclosure of the risks identified.142 Presum-
ably consumers would rather know about “risks identified” than
“steps taken,” as the latter may not correlate with the amount of
forced labor in one’s supply chain.143 However, requiring “risks
136. See Cosponsors: H.R. 3226—114th Congress (2015-2016), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.
congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/3226/cosponsors [https://perma.cc/WB26-W26C];
Cosponsors: H.R. 4842—113th Congress (2013-2014), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.
gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/4842/cosponsors [https://perma.cc/FB6T-YSQQ]; Cosponsors:
H.R. 2759—112th Congress (2011-2012), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-
congress/house-bill/2759/cosponsors [https://perma.cc/HGT2-5LPY].
137. S. 1968 § 3; H.R. 3226 § 3.
138. H.R. 3226 § 3 (defining “supply chain” as “all labor recruiters, suppliers of products,
component parts of products, and raw materials used ... in manufacturing [an] entity’s
products”); see also S. 1968 § 3 (same).
139. See S. 1968 § 2; H.R. 3226 § 2.
140. H.R. 3226 § 3 (requiring disclosures to “describ[e] to what extent, if any, the covered
issuer conducts any of the following”); see also S. 1968 § 3 (same).
141. S. 1968 § 3 (emphasis added); H.R. 3226 § 3 (same).
142. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(a)(1) (West 2017); Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30,
§ 54(4)(a) (Eng.).
143. See generally supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
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identified” is tantamount to requiring a corporation to disclose
whether there is forced labor in their supply chain, something the
prior disclosure regimes have avoided.
It is unclear whether requiring disclosure of “risks identified”
would survive a First Amendment challenge under National Associ-
ation of Manufacturers (NAM) v. SEC.144 NAM examined the SEC’s
Conflict Minerals Rule, a similar rule to the U.S. Bill. There, the
D.C. Circuit held the SEC’s Conflict Minerals Rule’s requirement
that companies using “conflict minerals” disclose whether their
products were “conflict free” or “not conflict free” was unconstitu-
tional.145 The D.C. Circuit concluded forcefully, “By compelling an
issuer to confess blood on its hands, the statute interferes with that
exercise of the freedom of speech under the First Amendment.”146
Because the U.S. Bill is similar to the Conflict Minerals Rule, the
U.S. Bill could be weakened by a First Amendment challenge.
Another major difference between the existing regimes and the
U.S. Bill is the enforcement mechanism. Amending the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 would subject companies to SEC scrutiny and
potential penalty for material omissions or misrepresentations in
their disclosures.147 Furthermore, while the U.S. Bill does not pro-
vide an express consumer mechanism for holding issuers account-
able, investors can bring private actions for an issuer’s material
omission or misrepresentation.148
While the bill seems more promising than the California Act from
a consumer-accountability standpoint, there are two major hurdles
to its passage. First, the SEC has expressed reluctance to accept the
responsibility for verifying supply-chain disclosures.149 In fact, the
SEC significantly rolled back enforcing its Conflict Minerals Rule in
April 2017.150 Second, it is unclear whether there is sufficient
144. 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. (NAM) v. SEC, No. 1:13-cv-
00635-KBJ, 2017 WL 3503370, *1, (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 2017).
145. See NAM, 800 F.3d at 530-31.
146. Id. at 530 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. (NAM) v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 371 (D.C. Cir.
2014)).
147. See 15 U.S.C. § 78r (2012); 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2016).
148. See 15 U.S.C. § 78r.
149. See Jeff Schwartz, The Conflict Minerals Experiment, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 129, 142
(2016).
150. Sarah N. Lynch, SEC Halts Some Enforcement of Conflict Minerals Rule amid Review,
REUTERS (Apr. 7, 2017, 3:23 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-sec-conflictminerals/
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political appetite to pass this kind of bill. In late 2016, GovTrack, a
website that predicts the likelihood of a bill’s passage, gave the bill
a 1 percent chance.151
For these reasons, the existing and proposed disclosure regimes
fall short as useful tools for consumers to hold corporations
accountable for supply-chain risks relating to forced labor. Weak
enforcement mechanisms in the California Act and the MSA allow
corporations to avoid disclosure or provide general policies of little
use to consumers. Finally, while the oft-proposed U.S. Bill would
require “risks identified,” combined with a powerful enforcement
arm, constitutional and administrative hurdles make the bill
unlikely to pass in the near term.
D. 2017: The French “Corporate Duty of Vigilance” Law, the Dutch
Child Labour Due Diligence Bill, and Other International
Developments
European nations appear eager to increase corporate accountabil-
ity for human rights abuses within supply chains.152 In February
2017, both the French and Dutch Parliaments adopted new corpo-
rate due-diligence laws.153 The Dutch bill still requires final ap-
proval by the Dutch Senate before becoming law.154 Because of their
recency, this Note merely introduces these laws and leaves their
impact to future studies.
On February 21, 2017, the French Parliament passed a law that
will impose a “corporate duty of vigilance” on large French corpora-
sec-halts-some-enforcement-of-conflict-minerals-rule-amid-review-idUSKBN1792WX?cid=
12232 [https://perma.cc/VD5M-Q43P].
151. H.R. 3226 (114th): Business Supply Chain Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery
Act of 2015, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr3226 [https://perma.
cc/2HS7-6B5X]; S. 1968 (114th): Business Supply Chain Transparency on Trafficking and
Slavery Acts of 2015, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s1968 [https://
perma.cc/P746-AN5F].
152. See France Adopts Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law: A First Historic Step Towards
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tions.155 The law presents the most aggressive requirements to
date.156 Starting January 1, 2018,157 covered entities must publish
an annual “vigilance plan,” which entails “[a] mapping that iden-
tifies, analyses and ranks [supply-chain] risks”; regular assessments
of subcontractors and suppliers; actions against human rights viola-
tions; reporting mechanisms; and annual public updates.158 Unlike
the existing disclosure regimes, failing to comply has meaningful
consequences.159 The law grants private parties and victims a
private right of action against corporations failing to comply, and a
court may fine a delinquent corporation up to €10 million.160
The French law’s scope, however, is limited.161 The law defines
covered entities as (1) French-headquartered corporations with five
thousand employees, including subsidiaries, or (2) a French corpo-
ration, even headquartered abroad, with ten thousand employees.162
Accordingly, the law will only cover 100-150 French corporations.163
The Dutch Child Labour Due Diligence Law, if passed by the
Dutch Senate, would take effect on January 1, 2020.164 This bill is
much broader than the French law, because it would cover all
companies that sell products to Dutch consumers, presumably
155. Id.
156. Littler Mendelson’s Bus. & Human Rights Practice Grp. & Alexandre Roumieu,
Proposed French Law Would Impose New Due Diligence Obligations on Certain Employers and
Their Supply Chains, LITTLER (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.littler.com/publication-press/
publication/proposed-french-law-would-impose-new-due-diligence-obligations-certain [https://
perma.cc/7K7Y-EPH5].
157. Devoir de Vigilance: Que Le Parcours fut Long!, SYNDICAT CFTC (Feb. 23, 2017),
https://www.cftc.fr/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/CP-23022017-devoir-de-vigilance-V2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TS3S-6PXX].




160. Id. arts. 1-2.
161. EUROPEAN COAL. FOR CORP. JUSTICE, FRENCH CORPORATE DUTY OF VIGILANCE LAW:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS no. 3 (2017), http://corporatejustice.org/documents/french-
corporate-duty-of-vigilance-law-faq.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WFR-UW6S].
162. French Duty of Vigilance Bill, art. 1.
163. EUR. COALITION FOR CORP. JUSTICE, supra note 152, no. 3.
164. Gerard Oonk, Child Labour Due Diligence Law for Companies Adopted by Dutch
Parliament, INDIA COMMITTEE NETH. (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.indianet.nl/170208e.html
[https://perma.cc/T5UH-H4YD].
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thousands.165 It would require companies to assess whether child
labor exists within the supply chains of products sold to Dutch
consumers, take actions to mitigate against those abuses, and make
public declarations of those assessments.166
Finally, there appears to be momentum of supply-chain disclosure
bills in Switzerland, Belgium, Spain, and Australia.167 The future
impact of these bills remains to be seen. At a minimum, it appears
that multinational corporations will be forced to disclose more about
their supply chains, which implicates the future of consumer protec-
tion litigation.168
III. NEW CONSUMER ACTIVISM: STRATEGIC CONSUMER LITIGATION
TO HOLD CORPORATIONS ACCOUNTABLE FOR SUPPLY-CHAIN RISKS
In August 2015, consumers filed the first consumer class action
against a corporation for selling goods produced, in part, by forced
labor.169 This marked a novel turn in consumer activism: consumers
seeking legal accountability for a corporation’s supply-chain prac-
tices rather than relying on collective consumer behavior. In that
case, Sud v. Costco Wholesale Corp., the plaintiffs alleged Costco
sold farmed prawns sourced from CP Foods, a Thai company that
fed those prawns with fishmeal sourced from “ghost ships” employ-
ing slave labor.170 Importantly, the plaintiffs alleged Costco did so
165. Liesbeth Unger, Due Diligence on Child Labour in the Netherlands; a New Law,
LINKEDIN (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/due-diligence-child-labour-
netherlands-new-law-liesbeth-unger [https://perma.cc/XX5J-6SGB]. 
166. Oonk, supra note 164.
167. See Cécile Barbière, France Leads EU on Duty of Care Requirements for Multina-
tionals, EURACTIV (Feb. 22, 2017) (Samuel White trans.), http://www.euractiv.com/section/
global-europe/news/france-leads-eu-on-duty-of-care-requirements-for-multinationals/ [https://
perma.cc/SM8F-7EN6]; EUR. COALITION FOR CORP. JUST., supra note 152; Farrah Tomazin,
Big Business Will be Forced to Report Annually on Slavery in Supply Chains, AGE (Aug. 16,
2017, 11:29 AM), http://www.theage.com.au/national/big-business-will-be-forced-to-report-
annually-on-slavery-in-supply-chains-20170815-gxwv20.html [https://perma.cc/SGR2-JZMY].
168. See infra Parts III-IV.
169. See Class Action Complaint, Sud v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 229 F.Supp. 3d 1075 (N.D.
Cal. 2017). For an earlier shareholder-derivative attempt along similar lines, see La. Mun.
Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Hershey Co., C.A. No. 7996-ML, 2013 WL 6120439, at *1-2 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 8, 2013).
170. Class Action Complaint, supra note 169, paras. 12-14, 16, 40, 112. CP Foods is the
largest prawn producer in the world. Norman Pickavance, We Can Fight Slavery with
Algorithms and Ambition, ETHICAL CORP. (Nov. 18, 2016), http://www.ethicalcorp.com/
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knowingly because NGOs and The Guardian had brought these
abuses to light more than a year earlier.171 This, they argued,
violated several of California’s consumer protection laws.172
Since Sud was filed, consumers have filed seven more class action
lawsuits against Hershey,173 Nestlé USA,174 Mars,175 and others.176
The suits alleged violations of California’s consumer protection
laws—namely, California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Con-
sumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), and False Advertising Law
(FAL).177 Specifically, the consumers’ main complaint, as discussed
more in Part III.B.1, was that the defendant-corporations inade-
quately disclosed the existing slavery in their supply chains, and
thus consumers were ill-informed when purchasing their products,
causing harm.178 All eight were dismissed, on several different
grounds ranging from lacking Article III standing to losing on the
merits.179
These suits have not all been for naught, as they have height-
ened awareness of this issue.180 Negative publicity can force drastic
content/we-can-fight-slavery-algorithms-and-ambition [https://perma.cc/Z4CU-FWPX].
171. Class Action Complaint, supra note 169, paras. 12, 24; see also Kate Hodal & Chris
Kelly, Trafficked into Slavery on Thai Trawlers to Catch Food for Prawns, GUARDIAN (June
10, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/jun/10/-sp-migrant-workers-
new-life-enslaved-thai-fishing [https://perma.cc/4XB5-NJAR].
172. Class Action Complaint, supra note 169, para. 28.
173. Dana v. Hershey Co., 180 F. Supp. 3d 652, 654-55 (N.D. Cal. 2016), appeal filed, No.
16-15789 (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 2016).
174. McCoy v. Nestle USA, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 954, 956 (N.D. Cal. 2016), appeal filed, No.
16-15794 (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 2016); Barber v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 3d 954, 956 (C.D.
Cal. 2015), appeal filed, No. 16-55041 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2016).
175. Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2016), appeal filed, No.
16-15444 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 2016); Wirth v. Mars Inc., No. SA CV 15-1470-DOC (KESx), 2016
WL 471234 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016), appeal filed, No. 16-55280 (9th Cir. Feb. 25, 2016).
176. De Rosa v. Tri-Union Seafoods, LLC, No. CV 15-07540-CJC(AGRx), 2016 WL 524059
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2016); Hughes v. Big Heart Pet Brands, No. CV 15-08007-CJC(AGRx),
2016 WL 524057 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2016). Notably, of the Early Eight, seven have been
brought by one plaintiffs’ law firm, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP.
177. See, e.g., McCoy, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 956. Each of the Early Eight was filed in Califor-
nia and applied California law, so this Note limits the following discussion to California law.
California is known for its consumer-friendly tort law. See California Tops Latest List of
‘Judicial Hellholes,’ AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.atra.org/2016/11/09/
california-tops-latest-list-judicial-hellholes/ [https://perma.cc/7VM9-72H2].
178. See, e.g., McCoy, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 956.
179. Six of the Early Eight are on appeal with the Ninth Circuit. See supra note 30.
180. For example, several of the largest news organizations have covered these lawsuits.
See, e.g., Samantha Masunaga, Costco Faces Lawsuit over Sale of Prawns Allegedly Farmed
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improvements in corporate social responsibility.181 However, given
the facts alleged and the existing legal frameworks, these suits were
destined to fall short of the accountability the plaintiffs sought. This
Part dissects the Early Eight to assess the hurdles consumers face
in alleging a cognizable legal harm in this context: standing, misrep-
resentation, and omission precedent, and California’s “safe harbor”
doctrine.
A. Alleging Standing Properly
As discussed in Part II, the existing and proposed supply-chain
disclosure regimes do not provide consumers a private right of ac-
tion upon which to sue. Thus, the plaintiffs relied on private rights
of action within California’s consumer protection statutes—UCL,182
CLRA,183 and FAL.184 Because the Early Eight were filed in federal
court, the first hurdle the plaintiffs faced was establishing Article
III standing.185
Article III standing has three requirements: (1) an injury in fact,
(2) causation, and (3) redressability.186 The consumers in the Early
Eight alleged that the defendant-corporations failed to disclose the
slavery in their supply chains, which led to misinformed purchas-
es, causing harm to the consumer-plaintiffs.187 As a remedy, they
sought forced disclosure of slavery in the defendants’ supply
chains.188 Notably, the remedy consumers sought extended beyond
by Slave Labor, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2015, 10:12 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-
costco-prawns-20150820-story.html [https://perma.cc/3DLR-SHFM]; Ian Urbina, Consumers
and Lawmakers Take Steps to End Forced Labor in Fishing, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/14/world/consumers-and-lawmakers-take-steps-to-end-
forced-labor-in-fishing.html [https://perma.cc/8KG8-MRXW]. 
181. See Simon Zadek, The Path to Corporate Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2004,
at 125 (detailing Nike’s path from corporate culprit to CSR leader); see also Torres et al.,
supra note 43, at 63-68 (arguing publicity of conflicts for Coca-Cola, Apple, and Walmart
caused them to take CSR leadership roles in their industries).
182. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17210 (West 2018).
183. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1752 (West 2017).
184. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500.
185. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
186. See id.
187. See, e.g., McCoy v. Nestle USA, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 954, 956, 962 (N.D. Cal. 2016),
appeal filed, No. 16-15794 (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 2016).
188. See, e.g., id. at 958.
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what the existing disclosure laws require.189 The remedy, however,
speaks to redressability, or the courts’ ability to redress the harm
with “a favorable decision.”190 Because a favorable decision would
address the alleged injury (the misinformation) by forcing disclo-
sures,191 redressability was met and not discussed. Furthermore,
causation was satisfied because corporations are responsible for
their disclosures. Therefore, the fight in several cases was on “injury
in fact.”
The Early Eight differ in how they assess “injury in fact.” Some
cases applied lax standards, while others required pleading with
great specificity.192 As a starting point, the courts determined that
if the inquiry was whether a consumer experiences “harm” when
consuming a good produced with slave labor, there would be no
injury in fact.193 However, the injury alleged is controlled by the
plaintiffs. In these cases, the alleged injury was purchasing a pro-
duct that “but for the [alleged] misrepresentation” they would not
have purchased.194
The cases applying lax standards held that was enough.195 Under
this standard, even a claim that the plaintiff “would have paid less”
for the product would constitute a cognizable injury.196 Furthermore,
several cases suggested an injury in fact would arise if the consumer
would have paid less for a product if they had known slavery existed
somewhere in the corporation’s supply chain.197 Under that final
189. See supra notes 89-90, 119 and accompanying text.
190. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,
38, 43 (1976)).
191. See, e.g., McCoy, 173 F. Supp. at 958.
192. Compare Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (requir-
ing a showing that the corporation’s supply chain for a product generally contained slavery),
appeal filed, No. 16-15444 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 2016), with Sud v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 229
F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1081-84 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (requiring a showing that the plaintiff ’s product
was a product of slave labor), appeal filed sub nom. Sud v. Costco, No. 17-15307 (9th Cir. Feb.
21, 2017).
193. See, e.g., Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1022.
194. See, e.g., Dana v. Hershey Co., 180 F. Supp. 3d 652, 661 (N.D. Cal. 2016), appeal filed,
No. 16-15789 (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 2016).
195. See id.; Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1022-23.
196. Dana, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 661; see also Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1022.
197. Dana, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 662-63; McCoy v. Nestle USA, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 954, 962-
64 (N.D. Cal. 2016), appeal filed, No. 16-15794 (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 2016); Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp.
3d at 1022.
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standard, the court need not determine whether the plaintiff knew
the purchased goods were produced via forced labor.198
Two district court decisions in Sud v. Costco Wholesale Corp.
articulated a stricter approach. There, the Northern District of Cali-
fornia emphasized that consumers must be able to trace the pur-
chased products to the forced labor.199 In the first Sud decision, the
court dismissed the complaint because the plaintiffs failed to show
that the purchased prawns originated from Thailand, where the
“ghost ship” practices took place.200 Costco, using its membership
and supply-chain data, showed that plaintiffs’ prawns originated in
Vietnam and Indonesia.201 Therefore, forced labor within Costco’s
supply chain broadly was insufficient to establish standing. In the
second Sud decision, after plaintiffs amended the complaint to
include plaintiffs who purchased prawns from Thailand, the court
dismissed the complaint against the supplier, CP Foods, because the
plaintiffs failed to allege that the prawns purchased were sourced
by CP Foods.202 The court emphasized traceability, stating that one
of the products purchased must be purchased from the defen-
dants.203
For the plaintiffs’ claim against Costco, the court applied an al-
together different standing inquiry. First, it distinguished between
plaintiffs’ omission and misrepresentation claims. For omissions,
the court held standing is met if plaintiffs prove they would have
been “aware” of the information had it been disclosed.204 For
example, consumers must allege that they read the company’s
supply-chain disclosures or packaging before making the purchase.
For misrepresentations, the court held standing is met if plaintiff
shows: (1) specific reliance on the misrepresentation when making
198. See Dana, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 662-63; McCoy, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 962-64; Hodsdon, 162
F. Supp. 3d at 1022 (“Hodsdon ties his harm to the lack of certainty about the source of the
cocoa beans .... [and] [i]n so doing, he has established injury in fact.”).
199. See Sud v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 229 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1081-82 (N.D. Cal. 2017),
appeal filed sub nom. Sud v. Costco, No. 17-15307 (9th Cir. Feb. 21, 2017); Sud v. Costco
Wholesale Corp., No. 15-cv-03783-JSW, 2016 WL 192569, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2016).
200. See Sud, 2016 WL 192569, at *1, *3.
201. See id. at *3.
202. See Sud, 229 F. Supp. 3d at 1081-82.
203. See id.
204. See id. at 1083.
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their purchase,205 or that (2) the misrepresentations “were part of an
extensive and long-term advertising campaign.”206 In summary, Sud
held that plaintiffs must rely on the omission or misrepresentation
in order to establish standing.207 Applying this standard, the court
found plaintiffs’ claim that they read Costco’s packaging before pur-
chasing the prawns was sufficient to establish standing.208 However,
plaintiffs failed to establish standing for their misrepresentation
claims because they did not prove that they read Costco’s supply-
chain disclosure statement—the basis of plaintiffs’ misrepresenta-
tion claim—before purchasing the prawns.209 Furthermore, Costco
had not incorporated its supply-chain disclosures as part of a long-
term advertising campaign.210
It remains unclear which standing standard California courts will
apply in future cases. The Early Eight demonstrate the various
standards courts could apply in this context. The Sud requirement
that plaintiffs must know that the product was sourced using slave
labor raises the bar as to what a plaintiff must allege to meet stand-
ing. As consumers generally lack awareness about where products
are sourced, this requirement limits the number of consumers that
could meet standing. Moreover, Sud shows the difficulty in suing a
supplier if a corporation sources the same product from multiple
suppliers in the region. In contrast, the lax standard would allow a
case to proceed to the merits on the fact that slavery exists some-
where in the corporation’s supply chain.
B. Seemingly Insurmountable Hurdles on the Merits
On the merits, the Early Eight failed because California consum-
er protection law does not require affirmative disclosures regarding
supply-chain abuses. The cases rested this determination on two re-
lated grounds. First, the courts declined to extend California’s
material misrepresentation and omission precedent to this scenar-
205. See id. at 1082-84.
206. Id. at 1084 (quoting In re Tobacco II Cases, 207 P.3d 20, 41 (Cal. 2009)).
207. See id. at 1082-83.
208. See id. at 1083.
209. See id. at 1084.
210. See id.
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io.211 Second, several cases barred the allegations under California’s
“safe harbor” doctrine because the California Legislature considered
and rejected affirmative admissions of supply-chain abuses.212
1. Material Misrepresentations and Omissions
A consumer has a cause of action against a corporation under Cal-
ifornia law if the corporation makes a material misrepresentation
or omission.213 Misrepresentations require a representation that was
misleading or false, and the falsity must be material.214 Omissions
require a duty to disclose and that the failure to do so was materi-
al.215
The main case alleging misrepresentation failed to convince the
court that the corporation had made one.216 In Barber v. Nestlé USA,
Ms. Barber claimed eight supply-chain representations on Nestlé’s
website were “false or misleading.”217 Nestlé’s representations in-
cluded, “a Supplier must under no circumstance use, or in any other
way benefit, from forced labour”; “[Nestlé] require[s] [its] supplies
[sic], agents, subcontractors and their employees to demonstrate
honesty, integrity and fairness, and to adhere to [the Nestlé
Supplier Code of Conduct]”; and “Suppliers will ensure [that] [t]here
is no known sourcing from Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
(IUU) fisheries and vessels.”218 Ms. Barber argued that evidence of
211. See Sud, 229 F. Supp. 3d at 1084-85, 1087; Dana v. Hershey Co., 180 F. Supp. 3d 652,
664-65 (N.D. Cal. 2016), appeal filed, No. 16-15789 (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 2016); McCoy v. Nestle
USA, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 954, 966 (N.D. Cal. 2016), appeal filed, No. 16-15794 (9th Cir. Apr.
29, 2016); Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1024-26 (N.D. Cal. 2016), appeal filed,
No. 16-15444 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 2016); Wirth v. Mars Inc., No. SA CV 15-1470-DOC (KESx),
2016 WL 471234, at *5-6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016), appeal filed, No. 16-55280 (9th Cir. Feb. 25,
2016); Barber v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 3d 954, 962-64 (C.D. Cal. 2015), appeal filed,
No. 16-55041 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2016).
212. See Wirth, 2016 WL 471234, at *6-9; Barber, 154 F. Supp. 3d at 958-59, 961-62; De
Rosa v. Tri-Union Seafoods, LLC, No. CV 15-07540-CJC(AGRx), 2016 WL 524059, at *1 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 15, 2016) (summarily dismissed for the reasons stated in Barber); Hughes v. Big
Heart Pet Brands, No. CV 15-08007-CJC(AGRx), 2016 WL 524057, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 15,
2016) (summarily dismissed for the reasons stated in Barber).
213. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
214. See Fox v. Pollack, 226 Cal. Rptr. 532, 536-37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
215. See Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1024, 1026.
216. See Barber, 154 F. Supp. 3d at 962-64.
217. Id. at 962-63.
218. Id. at 963.
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slavery in Nestlé’s supply chain, alone, made those statements
misleading.219 The court disagreed, finding those statements, “when
read in context,” merely “aspirational.”220 For emphasis, the court
noted that Nestlé was “not shy about identifying for consumers the
rules and expectations for its suppliers, but it d[id] not mislead
them into thinking that its suppliers abide by those rules and meet
those expectations in every instance.”221
Plaintiffs in Sud v. Costco Wholesale Corp. launched a similar
misrepresentation claim.222 There, plaintiffs pointed to Costco’s
California Transparency disclosure, which states that Costco “pro-
hibits human rights abuses in [its] supply chain.”223 One year prior,
reports detailed the “ghost ship” atrocities, and Costco continued to
purchase prawns from CP Foods.224 So how, plaintiffs argued, could
Costco claim it “prohibits human rights abuses in [its] supply
chain”?225 As discussed in Part III.A, the Northern District of
California ultimately dismissed those claims because the plaintiffs
failed to show they relied on those statements before purchasing the
prawns.226
The Early Eight also pointed to the absence of representations. In
particular, several cases argued that the defendant-corporations’
failures to disclose the existing slavery in their supply chains were
material omissions in violation of California’s FAL, UCL, and
CLRA.227
219. See id. at 962.
220. Id. at 963-64 (“[W]hen read in context ... no reasonable consumer ... could conclude
that Nestlé’s suppliers comply with Nestlé’s requirements in all circumstances.”).
221. Id. at 964.
222. Sud v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 229 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2017), appeal filed sub
nom. Sud v. Costco, No. 17-15307 (9th Cir. Feb. 21, 2017).
223. First Amended Class Action Complaint para. 19, Sud, 229 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (No. 4:15-
cv-03783-JSW).
224. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
225. First Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 223, para. 19.
226. See supra notes 207, 209 and accompanying text.
227. See, e.g., McCoy v. Nestle USA, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 954, 957 (N.D. Cal. 2016), appeal
filed, No. 16-15794 (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 2016); Plaintiff ’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss at 9 n.46, Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (No. 3:15-cv-
04450-RS); Complaint for Violation of California Consumer Protection Laws paras. 72-77, 89-
92, 99-103, Wirth v. Mars Inc., No. SA-CV15-1470-DOC (KESx), 2016 WL 471234  (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 5, 2016).
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The FAL omission claims were summarily dismissed, because the
FAL covers misrepresentations, not omissions.228 For a material
omission under the UCL and CLRA, the consumer-plaintiff must
show the corporation had a duty to disclose the information at is-
sue.229 Corporations do not have a broad duty to disclose.230 Instruc-
tive precedent is Hall v. Sea World Entertainment Inc., in which
plaintiffs, visitors of SeaWorld parks, alleged that SeaWorld “omit-
ted information concerning the conditions and treatment of the
whales.”231 The court rejected a broad duty to disclose, stating such
a broad duty would “effectively require any company selling any
product or service to affirmatively disclose every conceivable piece
of information about th[e] product or service ... because inevitably
some customer would find such information relevant to his or her
purchase.”232 The courts in the Early Eight followed this reasoning
and rejected a broad duty to disclose, stating that an unbounded
material-omission doctrine “could leave manufacturers (chocolate or
otherwise) little guidance about what information, if any, it must
disclose to avoid ... UCL liability.”233
When do corporations have a duty to disclose under California
consumer protection law? California courts generally agree that
duty arises in two related contexts: product-design defects or safety
hazards.234 This narrow material-omission doctrine provides cer-
tainty to companies as to what they must disclose and serves con-
sumers’ interests in receiving pertinent information about product
risks.235
However, one case, often cited by the consumer-plaintiffs in the
Early Eight, found a duty to disclose outside of the product-design
or safety-hazard contexts.236 In Stanwood v. Mary Kay, the con-
sumer complained that Mary Kay fraudulently omitted information
228. See, e.g., Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1023-24.
229. See id. at 1024-26.
230. See id. at 1024-25; Wirth, 2016 WL 471234, at *4-5.
231. No. 3:15-CV-660-CAB-RBB, 2015 WL 9659911, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2015).
232. Id. at *7.
233. Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1025-26; see also Wirth, 2016 WL 471234, at *4 (citing
Hall, 2015 WL 9659911, at *7).
234. See Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1024-26; Wirth, 2016 WL 471234, at *4-5.
235. See Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1026; Wirth, 2016 WL 471234, at *4.
236. See Stanwood v. Mary Kay, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1221 (C.D. Cal. 2012); see also
Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1025; Wirth, 2016 WL 471234, at *4-5.
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that it tested products on animals, in violation of California’s UCL,
CLRA, and FAL.237 The Stanwood court held that a duty to disclose
always exists if the information was “material”—affecting the pur-
chasing decision of a reasonable consumer.238 Ms. Stanwood estab-
lished materiality by producing a survey which found 72 percent of
respondents thought testing cosmetics on animals was “inhumane
or unethical” and 61 percent believed cosmetic companies should be
barred from animal testing.239 Thus, because Ms. Stanwood estab-
lished the omission was “material,” she had adequately pleaded a
violation of California’s UCL and CLRA.240 However, the Early
Eight courts rejected Stanwood, reiterating the policy against
having a broad duty to disclose.241
The Early Eight also rejected the omission claims under the
UCL’s “unfairness prong.” The UCL’s unfairness prong prohibits
“any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and
unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.”242 To succeed,
a plaintiff must prove the challenged business practice—here, the
omission of known supply-chain abuses on product packaging—
either (1) is “immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or sub-
stantially injurious to consumers,” or (2) violates public policy.243
The Early Eight rejected these arguments.244 In particular, the
Early Eight distinguished between slave labor in one’s supply chain
—immoral and against public policy—and the omission, which they
held was not.245 Business practices only violate public policy when
there is a clearly stated public policy against that practice.246 These
237. 941 F. Supp. 2d at 1215-16.
238. Id. at 1221.
239. Id. at 1223.
240. Id.
241. See, e.g., McCoy v. Nestle USA, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 954, 965-66 (N.D. Cal. 2016),
appeal filed, No. 16-15794 (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 2016); Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1025-26.
242. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2018).
243. Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1026 (quoting S. Bay Chevrolet v. Gen. Motors
Acceptance Corp., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 301 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)).
244. See Sud v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 229 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2017),
appeal filed sub nom. Sud v. Costco, No. 17-15307 (9th Cir. Feb. 21, 2017); Dana v. Hershey
Co., 180 F. Supp. 3d 652, 667-68 (N.D. Cal. 2016), appeal filed, No. 16-15789 (9th Cir. Apr. 29,
2016); McCoy, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 967-69; Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1027.
245. See Sud, 229 F. Supp. 3d at 1089; Dana, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 667-68; McCoy, 173 F.
Supp. 3d at 967-69; Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1027.
246. See McCoy, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 968-69.
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claims failed, therefore, because plaintiffs could not point to a
clearly stated public policy against omitting known supply-chain
risks on product packaging.
The Early Eight’s parsing of the conduct, between slave labor in
a corporation’s supply chain and the corporation’s omission, exem-
plifies the consumer-plaintiffs’ catch-22. Consumers currently must
choose between (1) establishing standing and failing on the merits
and (2) raising arguments that would succeed on the merits and
failing for lack of standing. For example, several cases failed on the
merits because the defendant’s omissions were not counter to public
policy.247 However, plaintiffs could not establish standing if they
argued the “unfair” business practice was the corporation’s use of
slave labor in its supply chain.248 Defendants would raise strong
injury-in-fact and causation objections, because consumers did not
feel a direct harm due to the corporation’s use of slave labor.
Accordingly, to meet standing consumers must allege the harm was
caused by the omission, but this eviscerates their ability to succeed
on the merits because the omission does not relate to product safety
or violate a clearly stated public policy.
2. Application of the “Safe Harbor” Doctrine
Four of the Early Eight also applied California’s “safe harbor”
doctrine to dismiss the complaints.249 California’s safe harbor
doctrine is rooted in legislative intent. It shields corporations from
UCL, CLRA, and FAL liability if the California Legislature has
“considered a situation and concluded that no action should lie.”250
The relevant legislative action in the Early Eight was the California
247. See Dana, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 667-68; McCoy, 173 F. Supp. 3d at 968-69; Hodsdon, 162
F. Supp. 3d at 1027.
248. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
249. See Barber v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 3d 954, 961 (C.D. Cal. 2015), appeal filed,
No. 16-55041 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2016); Wirth v. Mars Inc., No. SA CV 15-1470-DOC(KESx),
2016 WL 471234, at *7-9 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016) (following Barber), appeal filed, No. 16-
55280 (9th Cir. Feb. 25, 2016); De Rosa v. Tri-Union Seafoods, LLC, No. CV 15-07540-
CJC(AGRx), 2016 WL 524059, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2016) (following Barber with no discus-
sion); Hughes v. Big Heart Pet Brands, No. CV 15-08007-CJC(AGRx), 2016 WL 524057, at *1
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2016) (following Barber with no discussion).
250. Barber, 154 F. Supp. 3d at 958 (quoting Cel-Tech Comms., Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel.
Co., 973 P.2d 527, 541 (Cal. 1999)) (UCL liability barred).
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Act.251 As discussed, the remedy sought in the Early Eight was
forced disclosure of supply-chain abuses, beyond what the California
Act requires.252 Based on the Act’s text and legislative history, sever-
al courts concluded that California’s legislature “considered” the
extent of required disclosures and “determin[ed] that businesses’
responsibilities to inform consumers about the presence of forced
labor in supply chains beg[a]n and end[ed] with the required dis-
closures in § 1714.43.”253 Accordingly, four cases that tried to force
additional disclosure were barred by the safe harbor doctrine.254
Whether the safe harbor doctrine should apply in this context is
disputed. Hodsdon v. Mars critiqued its applicability based on the
California Act for three reasons. First, Hodsdon rejected the con-
clusion that California’s legislature “considered [the] situation and
concluded no action should lie.”255 Specifically, the court wrote,
“[A]lthough there is evidence suggesting the legislature considered
how to provide consumers with ‘reasonable access to basic informa-
tion to aid their purchasing decisions’ the legislative history is silent
about whether the legislature contemplated disclosures on labels,”
the relief requested there.256 Second, Hodsdon noted, hypothetically,
that if a safe harbor did apply, it would not shield omissions of child
labor (complained about in that case) because the Act only covers
“efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking.”257 Finally, the
safe harbor would lead to an inequitable result where corporations
with over $100 million in revenue (those covered by the Supply
Chains Act) would be protected and smaller companies could still be
liable.258
251. See id. at 958-59.
252. See id. at 959; see also supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
253. Barber, 154 F. Supp. 3d at 962; see also Wirth, 2016 WL 471234, at *7-9 (following
Barber); De Rosa, 2016 WL 524059, at *1 (following Barber); Hughes, 2016 WL 524057, at *1
(following Barber).
254. See supra note 249.
255. Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1029 (N.D. Cal. 2016), appeal filed, No.
16-15444 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 2016). But see Wirth, 2016 WL 471234, at *7-9; Barber, 154 F.
Supp. 3d at 962.
256. Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1029 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Contra Barber,
154 F. Supp. 3d at 962.
257. Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1029; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(a)(1) (West 2017).
258. Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1029.
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Despite Hodsdon’s criticism of the safe harbor, the court dis-
missed the complaint on other grounds and left the safe harbor
dispute unresolved.259 Accordingly, no precedent has rejected the
safe harbor doctrine in this context.260 Although this remains an
open dispute, several California courts appear uneasy with the
doctrine’s application based on the California Act.261
Of the Early Eight, six are on appeal with the Ninth Circuit.262 It
is unclear how the Ninth Circuit will resolve the lower-court dis-
crepancies in standing standards and the safe harbor doctrine.263
However, for the reasons this Note discusses, the interplay between
standing and hurdles on the merits eliminates consumer-activists’
chances of success in these suits.264 For consumer-activists, the issue
is not yet ripe.265 Thus, consumer class actions remain a dull means
for effecting corporate supply-chain accountability.
IV. HOW CONTINUED APPLICATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW
MIGHT YIELD REDRESS TO CONSUMERS IN THE FUTURE
Consumer legal activism has thus far failed to elicit better supply-
chain transparency and accountability from corporations. However,
consumer class actions may gain traction in the future for two
reasons. First, the Ninth Circuit, which currently has six of the
Early Eight on appeal, could lay down plaintiff-friendly law in this
context.266 Second, and more likely, however, is that the issue will
become ripe for redress under consumer protection law.
259. Id.
260. See supra notes 249-54 and accompanying text; cf., e.g., Barber, 154 F. Supp. 3d at 958
(citing Cel-Tech Comms., Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527 (Cal. 1999)) (explaining
the safe harbor doctrine).
261. See Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 1029; see also McCoy v. Nestle USA, Inc., 173 F.
Supp. 3d 954, 972 (N.D. Cal. 2016), (“The Court ... echoes [Hodsdon’s] skepticism that the safe
harbor doctrine is as broad as Nestlé contends.”), appeal filed, No. 16-15794 (9th Cir. Apr. 29,
2016).
262. See supra note 30.
263. See supra Part III.A.
264. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
265. See supra Part III.A.
266. For example, the Ninth Circuit could follow the Hodsdon injury-in-fact standard, see
supra notes 194-98 and accompanying text, and follow Stanwood with respect to material
omissions, see supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
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This Part details the future applicability of consumer protection
law in holding corporations accountable for supply-chain disclosures
and “efforts.” It draws from another area in consumer protection
law—privacy—and applies recent precedent to hypothetical fact
patterns in the supply-chain disclosure space. Finally, it assumes
that, eventually, companies will compete more meaningfully on
supply-chain disclosures as these disclosure regimes become more
familiar to consumers, NGOs, and the businesses themselves. If
history of privacy disclosures is precedent, greater competition on
supply-chain disclosures may lead to the occasional misrepresenta-
tion, in the form of over-selling a company’s efforts, which would
provide grounds for a consumer class action or Federal Trade
Commission enforcement action.267
What was missing from the Early Eight was a true misrepresen-
tation. The theory of omission law fails in this context because,
under California law, corporations do not have a duty to disclose
that information and the omission is not contrary to public policy.268
Thus, alleging a material misrepresentation is the only avenue for
future consumer success. To date, Barber held supply-chain commit-
ments were “aspirational” and therefore not misleading,269 and Sud
dismissed similar claims on standing.270 Both are on appeal with the
Ninth Circuit.271
On appeal, if the Ninth Circuit wanted to rule in favor of the
plaintiffs, it could invoke the “misrepresentation-by-omission” doc-
trine. The doctrine requires a plaintiff to identify a material, ex-
press statement and prove the “omitted information ... undercuts
the veracity of the statement.”272 In fact, Hodsdon noted that the
plaintiff ’s FAL claim would have continued had he pointed to an
express statement by Mars that was undercut by the slavery in its
267. Cf., e.g., infra notes 298-300.
268. See supra notes 233-35, 244-46 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
271. Sud v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 229 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2017), appeal filed sub
nom. Sud v. Costco, No. 17-15307 (9th Cir. Feb. 21, 2017); Barber v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 154 F.
Supp. 3d 954 (C.D. Cal. 2015), appeal filed, No. 16-55041 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 2016).
272. See Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1023 (N.D. Cal. 2016), appeal filed,
No. 16-15444 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 2016).
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supply chain.273 Furthermore, if the Ninth Circuit reaches the
merits of Sud’s misrepresentation claim, the doctrine could apply.274
For example, the Ninth Circuit could rule that the “ghost ship”
atrocities in Costco’s supply chain make Costco’s assertion that it
“prohibits human rights abuses in [its] supply chain” a misrepresen-
tation by omission.275 The misrepresentation-by-omission doctrine
is therefore the first possible grounds for future consumer redress.276
In future cases, affirmative misrepresentation claims (express
misrepresentations, not through omission) might also play a role.
Corporations have already begun to compete, on the margins, on
supply-chain transparency. For example, several clothing manufac-
turers, such as American Apparel and PACT, advertise their
clothing as “sweatshop-free.”277 Nisolo, a shoe company, advertises
that its partner factories in León, Mexico, offer their employees
healthcare and vacation benefits and pledge that their employees
are older than 18.278 Senda Athletics creates “fair trade soccer balls”
and promotes them as produced with no child labor.279 Finally, a list
of ethically sourced chocolate producers exists and is growing.280 In
future cases, if a company oversells the purity of its supply chain,
consumers who relied on that advertisement have a seasonable
273. Id. (citing In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F.
Supp. 2d 942, 991 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (denying dismissal of a FAL claim because Sony stated it
took reasonable efforts to protect consumers’ data but omitted known flaws in its security
system)).
274. Cf. Sud, 229 F. Supp. 3d 1075.
275. See Demand for Jury Trial at 3-4, Sud, 229 F. Supp. 3d 1075 (No. 15-cv-03783).
276. Cf. Sud, 229 F. Supp. 3d 1075; Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d 1023.
277. See How It’s Made, AM. APPAREL, http://www.americanapparel.com/en/aboutus/how-
its-made.jsp [https://perma.cc/J4WA-QX5K]; Organic Is Better, PACT APPAREL, https://wear
pact.com/about [https://perma.cc/6ZT2-4MQT].
278. Impact Report, NISOLO, https://nisolo.com/pages/ethically-made [https://perma.cc/
SQ94-HM2C].
279. Premium Quality Soccer Balls that Give Back, SENDA ATHLETICS, https://senda
athletics.com/pages/fair-trade [https://perma.cc/2JQ6-DPHU]. 
280. Ethical Chocolate Companies, SLAVE FREE CHOCOLATE, http://www.slavefreechocolate.
org/ethical-chocolate-companies/ [https://perma.cc/356L-NHPE].
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misrepresentation claim.281 The First Amendment would not protect
these corporate misrepresentations.282
As alluded to by the Sud v. Costco Wholesale Corp. example,
however, these misrepresentations may arise in a corporation’s
supply-chain disclosure statements.283 With the UK’s MSA taking
effect, over ten thousand companies not initially covered by Califor-
nia’s Act will make supply-chain disclosures.284 The sheer number
of these disclosures significantly increases the chance that a
corporation will make an express misrepresentation or misrepresen-
tation by omission, even out of carelessness. Take L Brands’, the
parent of Victoria’s Secret and Bath & Body Works, California Act
statement as a hypothetical example.285 In it, L Brands makes
several express representations: it prohibits the sourcing of Uzbek
and Turkmen cotton; its internal Sourcing Risk Committee meets
quarterly; suppliers failing audits must submit corrective action
plans within thirty days and must correct conduct within ninety;
suppliers failing to correct face a warning letter, reduction of
business, and ultimately loss of business; it participates in the
Business Council for Global Development; and it supports the FACT
(Factory Awareness to Counter Trafficking) training initiative
annually.286 Hypothetically, if any of those representations are false,
L Brands would have made a misrepresentation.287 A consumer
would just need to prove materiality.288
281. See McCoy v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 954, 964 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (arguing if
Nestlé had “concealed Ivorian labor conditions from its consumers [and] falsely labeled all of
its chocolate as certified to be free of child labor ... a customer who relied on that false
promotion” would have a seasonable false advertising claim), appeal filed, No. 16-15794 (9th
Cir. Apr. 29, 2016).
282. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 259 (Cal. 2002) (holding Nike’s allegedly mislead-
ing statements about factory working conditions were not entitled to full protections of the
First Amendment).
283. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 169, para. 19.
284. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
285. See California Transparency in Supply Chains Act: Modern Slavery Statement for Fis-
cal 2016, L BRANDS, https://www.lb.com/responsibility/supply-chain/california-transparency-
act-statement [https://perma.cc/JL3J-UXUV]. As a disclaimer, this Note uses L Brands be-
cause it published a robust and concrete California Act statement. For this, L Brands should
be applauded. This Note uses its statements for purely hypothetical purposes, and nothing
in this Section should be construed to insinuate that any of the statements listed are false.
286. Id.
287. See supra Part III.B.1.
288. See supra Part III.B.1.
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But why would L Brands affirmatively state that it prohibits the
use of Uzbek cotton in its supply chain if it does not? Does L Brands
not have incentives—for example, public criticism and litigation—to
avoid making misrepresentations? Such disclosures are unwise, but
as the data privacy context suggests, corporations make affirmative
misrepresentations with some frequency.289
Administrative action by the FTC serves as another mechanism
for consumer redress. The FTC’s deception authority is triggered
when a corporation makes a: (1) “representation, omission or prac-
tice” (2) “that is likely to mislead the [reasonable] consumer” and
(3) is “material.”290 If a corporation made an express misrepresenta-
tion about its supply chain or “efforts taken,” a court would analyze
the empirical questions within the second and third elements.291
Would the statement mislead the average consumer? And would
that average consumer have changed her behavior had she known
about the misrepresented information? These are factual inquiries
which could vary depending on the statements.
One recent disagreement in FTC circles entails the presumption
of materiality and what facts rebut it.292 The FTC’s Policy Statement
on Deception states that express statements are presumed to be ma-
terial.293 In the supply-chain context, the FTC could argue that ex-
press supply-chain disclosures on a company’s website are presumed
to be material. FTC enforcement in this space, therefore, may
provide consumer redress more readily than private class actions
because consumers may not utilize this presumption.294 However,
others believe that the key materiality inquiry remains whether
“consumers would have chosen differently but for the deception.”295
Consumers say publicly that sweatshop practices would materially
289. See infra notes 298-300 and accompanying text.
290. See Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to the Honorable
John D. Dingell, Chairman, Comm. on Energy & Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives
(Oct. 14, 1983) [hereinafter FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION], appended to Cliffdale
Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 app. at 174, 174-75 (1984).
291. Cf. id.
292. See Dissenting Statement of Joshua D. Wright, In re Nomi Technologies, Inc., F.T.C.
Matter No. 132-3251, at 3-4 (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/ pub-
lic_statements/638371/150423nomiwrightstatement.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7X4-VM9T].
293. FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION, supra note 290, at app. at 182.
294. Cf. id.
295. Id. at app. at 183.
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affect their purchasing decisions,296 but some empirical evidence
suggests otherwise.297
While litigating parties might reasonably fight over materiality,
the FTC’s recent enforcement actions in the privacy space suggest
the FTC could extract settlements from companies for misleading
supply-chain disclosures. A few examples are worth noting. First,
the FTC settled with Very Incognito Technologies over their adver-
tisements that they participated in the Asia-Pacific Economic Coop-
eration (APEC) Cross-Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) certification
system, when it did not.298 In Henry Schein Practice Solutions, the
FTC settled with a company that advertised using “industry-stan-
dard” encryption to protect sensitive medical patient information,
even though it used substandard procedures.299 Finally, in In re
Snapchat, the FTC alleged, among other things, that Snapchat
deceived consumers by advertising that “snaps” disappeared when
in actuality they did not.300 These representations appear similar to
or more benign than the L Brands’ supply-chain hypotheticals
above.
It is unclear, however, whether the FTC would pursue supply-
chain misrepresentations with the same vigor it has in the privacy
context. Consumer data privacy has received much more attention
than supply-chain exploitation on Capitol Hill over the last five
years.301 Perhaps this relates to harm felt by the constituent.302 In
296. See Jens Hainmueller et al., Consumer Demand for the Fair Trade: Evidence from a
Multistore Field Experiment, 97 REV. ECON. & STAT. 242, 242 (2015).
297. See Neeru Paharia et al., Sweatshop Labor Is Wrong Unless the Shoes Are Cute:
Cognition Can Both Help and Hurt Moral Motivated Reasoning, 121 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 81, 86-87 (2013) (finding “participants endorsed sweatshop labor
when self-interest was high”); Young & McCoy, supra note 38, at 52.
298. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Hand-Held Vaporizer Company Settles FTC
Charges It Deceived Consumers About Participation in International Privacy Program (May
4, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/05/hand-held-vaporizer-
company-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived [https://perma.cc/7GG9-VKZ4].
299. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Dental Software Provider Settles FTC Charges
It Misled Customers About Encryption of Patient Data (Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/press-releases/2016/01/dental-practice-software-provider-settles-ftc-charges-it-
misled [https://perma.cc/D2QF-3LW9].
300. Complaint paras. 6-12, Snapchat, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4501 (Dec. 23, 2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/141231snapchatcmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BU7A-ZZ5R].
301. From January 1, 2012, to February 15, 2017, Congress held hundreds of congressional
hearings on the topic of consumer data privacy and held a few dozen on human trafficking.
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the data privacy context, a breach could expose the consumer to
significant, direct future harm—medical, financial, or otherwise—
whereas consumer harm is felt more indirectly in the supply-chain
context.303 The real harm in the latter case is to those trapped in
forced labor, somewhere in the world.304 Thus, presumably Congress
and the FTC obtain more political capital for pursuing data privacy
misrepresentations than they would for corporate supply-chain
misrepresentations. Nonetheless, the sheer number of future
supply-chain promises—in advertisements and in mandatory
disclosure statements—may implicate the FTC’s consumer protec-
tion authority to reign in bad actors.
Robust enforcement, or even the threat of enforcement—private
class action or FTC enforcement—in the supply-chain disclosure
context has costs. One potential downside to enforcement is that it
creates a disincentive to be specific with one’s disclosures. For in-
stance, if a company states its supply-chain policies with particular-
ity and makes a material mistake, it could be scrutinized under
misrepresentation law. In other words, there is an incentive to
remain vague and discuss only the company’s “commitments” to
supply-chain best practices to shield it from misrepresentation
liability. If every company lists only broad “commitments,” disclo-
sures are of no use to consumers. However, disclosures have always
been and will continue to be driven by competition. As the landscape
changes, corporate executives will be forced to weigh the costs of
vague disclosure versus the marketplace benefits of concrete
disclosure.305 If NGOs and consumers, through standard-setting
recommendations, comparisons among competitors, and actual
changes in purchasing behavior, increase the demand for corporate
supply-chain competition, this pressure could force a “race to the
top” that consumer activists seek.306
See Advanced Search, U.S. GOV’T PUB. OFF., https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/advanced/adv
searchpage.action [https://perma.cc/58BL-2R2V] (search “consumer data privacy” and “human
trafficking”; then parse out relevant hearings).
302. Cf. id.
303. See supra notes 298-300 and accompanying text.
304. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
305. See generally Doorey, supra note 32, at 372.
306. Cf. id.
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In sum, consumer activism in the future may play a role in
holding corporations accountable for their supply-chain efforts.307
However, a misrepresentation must first be made.308 The UK MSA,
which will increase the companies disclosing supply-chain practices
by over ten thousand, could provide future bases for misrepresenta-
tion claims.309 Companies should draft carefully.
CONCLUSION
To date, consumers have been unable to hold corporations ac-
countable for their supply-chain practices. As discussed in Part II,
fundamental flaws in the supply-chain disclosure regimes limit
their efficacy to serve as consumer tools upon which to base boycotts
or purchasing decisions.310 Consumer activists who have turned to
the courts, in the Early Eight, have also been unsuccessful.311
Future developments, however, including increased competition
on supply-chain disclosures and the sheer volume of disclosures,
may provide future grounds for consumer legal activism. This Note
does not suggest that consumer legal activism will provide the
proper incentive structure for companies to engage in supply-chain
control or be transparent with consumers. Rather, this Note argues
that future cases may provide consumer redress under California’s
consumer protection precedent or FTC enforcement.312 If corpora-
tions oversell their supply-chain efforts, consumers can and should
play a role in holding corporations accountable.
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